orporate leadership frequently finds its greatest tests during crises. Characterized by fast moving developments and an element of danger, crises can overwhelm executives and present them with often contradictory tasks and responsibilities. And it’s difficult to act strategically when minute-by-minute demands require a host of immediate decisions. The media adds yet another degree of complexity to such situations. It can act as a conduit to important audiences during a crisis, or become an obstacle to the delivery of messages.

Of course, not every organizational difficulty attracts media notice. And not every problem is a crisis. When a new product roll-out gets caught in an unexpected patent infringement suit, it’s definitely a problem. A crisis? Not necessarily. But when a business problem threatens to severely affect the organization’s normal workflow, when it distracts senior management, when it affects a company’s financial well-being and image and reputation in the eyes of critical constituencies – it’s likely a crisis.

The U.S. National Weather Service ranks hurricanes in severity from Category 1 to Category 5. Organizational crises can be assessed in a similar way. And just as a Category 1 or 2 hurricane can suddenly mutate into a Category 4 or 5 monster, so organizational crises can spiral into unexpected proportions. And the media’s presence during a crisis raises the potential for greater organizational harm.

Understanding which category of crisis a company faces can help determine the media sources best suited to deliver a message. And because crises are by definition volatile, the nature of a crisis may shift from one category to another. These shifts occur when a new set of stakeholders become affected or concerned and when the media tracks this new-found interest.

Varieties of Crises

Crises come in several varieties. If a company is facing bankruptcy, hostile take-over, a strike, or massive employee lay-offs, the crisis originates in the financial arena, and financial media and business reporters will naturally have the most initial interest. Examples of notable financial crises include the Salomon Brothers Treasury Bill crisis of 1991-92 and Enron. When the courts form the battleground – in litigation crises – the adversarial system lends itself to vocal, antagonistic claims from plaintive parties, which can find their way onto the front page. Examples of such crises include the long-running Dow-Corning breast implant crisis of the 1990s and the Microsoft-U.S. anti-trust battles.

Some business issues become popular crises, which can gain strength over time and can foment the need for legislative action. Frequently, these crises arise when the issue’s advocacy group can enlist media to publicize its sense of fear, or when an issue speaks to a constituency’s sense of moral or legal rights. Examples include Nike’s use of Third World factory production and Nestle’s marketing of infant formula in Third World countries in the 1970s and 1980s. Finally, crises can be caused by physical events such as fires, earthquakes, hurricanes, contamination, or criminal actions. Examples of such physical crises include Three Mile Island in 1979 or the Exxon-Valdez oil spill of 1990. In most crises, a primary objective is to keep the situation anchored in one of the categories and reduce the likelihood that it will shift to another.

If handled properly, the media can be an important ally. But one has to understand the five key drivers that spur the media’s crisis coverage in order to do so. Fundamentally, informing is the media’s business – who, what, when, where, and why. Failing to respond to questions is thus a prescription for confrontation with reporters. In physical crises – such as natural disasters and chemical spills that threaten communities – the public and government rely on the media, especially electronic media, to convey information and aid to the public. The downside of media coverage is the press’ tendency to play to the worst of tabloid journalism’s excesses. The goal of titillation has plenty of critics. But news directors at competing stations will still risk the wrath of police chiefs by flying so many news choppers above a breaking story that they impede the police. Assigning blame is a consistent goal for the press – and something companies want to avoid. Finally, the national exposure that can accompany an individual journalist’s coverage of a crisis can be a springboard for job offers and career advancement.

An organization under intense media scrutiny can respond with a variety of overall strategies (See Figure 1). At root, leaders have to make decisions in two dimensions: how aggressive or passive a company responds, and how free a company feels about its options.

“In the court of public opinion, silence or the refusal to defend oneself is equated with guilt.”

Based on those decisions, four initial strategies emerge: “Free to attack” is the strategy that can work only when a company has a highly credible story to tell. The underlying facts must support the message and the tactics employed must take into account the culpability lurking beneath the accusations. In the 1990s, this strategy was adopted with varying degrees of success. In 1993, NBC’s Dateline broadcasted footage ostensibly showing a Chevrolet pick-up explode as a result of gas tanks positioned beneath the driving cab. General Motors learned that the sequence had been staged, using incendiary devices to set off the explosions. GM obtained out-takes, called a news conference, and exposed the deception. NBC apologized publicly and fired those responsible.

When choices are limited and a company nonetheless feels compelled to react, it is “forced to defend.” For such an approach to work, the company needs to receive a receptive hearing from the media or, at least, get its version of events delivered in a credible context. Accused of underpaying and exploiting labor in the Third World, Nike in the 1990s defended its business strategy by claiming financial benefits for the shoe workers. Later, Nike defended its actions by claiming it did not directly run the sneaker factory. Eventually, the company adopted a problem-solving strategy – to be discussed later in this article – and instituted a series of remedies, including overseers and improved accountability.

The “forced to avoid” approach positions the company in passive mode, in which conditions force a kind of silence. Because of extenuating circumstances or lack of information, this strategy is most frequently framed by the message, “We are unable to comment at this time.” Legal departments will often counsel using this approach since it offers apparent protection from miscues and misquotes that could be used against the firm. Even when justified legally, however, this strategy puts the company in a vulnerable position. In the court of public opinion, silence or the refusal to defend oneself is equated with guilt. Meanwhile, any number of other interested parties will be sure to voice their reactions. In 1999, when the Bank of New York was charged with money laundering for organized crime, the firm adopted this strategy. However, information was leaked to the press, apparently from those close to the investigation. Coverage increased as reporters searched for the names of responsible parties to blame. The Bank of New York, with its patrician reputation in the crucible, suffered from media over-exposure and tabloid-like investigation.

Free to Ignore

If a company believes it cannot be harmed by media coverage, then it may opt not to make spokespersons available. This strategy has often been adopted by industrial suppliers or non-consumer based companies. Privately held companies also often believe that this response to media inquiry is the best. And international companies with U.S. based subsidiaries sometimes adopt this approach; their cultural misreading of the media’s role in the U.S. business scene leads them to believe that what works in the home country – silence – will work well here.

The danger behind this strategy lies in its assumptions of insularity and strength. Most companies in fact do need to consider the secondary effects that result from the media’s coverage of its actions. And privately held companies ultimately have customers who are susceptible to media influence. During the 1980s, companies felt particularly free to ignore media inquiry. Hooker Chemical, which adopted a no-comment policy in the wake of the Love Canal environmental crisis, was a prime example. By the time the company responded to allegations and lawsuits, its credibility was profoundly undermined. Unanswered, third-party comments will accumulate, potentially affecting image and reputation.

Overlooked Strategy

A fifth strategy is frequently overlooked: problem-solving. Whenever a company can position its response as a meaningful effort to acknowledge and correct the phenomenon that led to the crisis, media coverage will become more favorable and stakeholder impressions will in the long run not impugn the company’s reputation.

Figure Two illustrates how this approach can be placed on the original model’s horizontal axis spanning “free to respond” to “forced to respond.” Thus, a company can be proactive and “free to solve.” For example, a company can appoint an outsider to oversee new personnel policies in the face of federal discrimination suits. Or it can be apologetic – “forced to solve” – as when it acknowledges system or worker error as the cause of an accident.

problem-solving strategy, however, rarely comes to mind for most managers. Reasons range from concerns about admitting legal liability to the cultural reluctance of competitive, success-oriented business executives to admit error. But when a company can position its response as a meaningful effort to acknowledge and correct the phenomenon that has led to the crisis, media coverage will usually become more favorable and stakeholder impressions will not ultimately impugn the company’s reputation.

A notable example of the problem-solving approach came in 1996. When the oil giant Texaco was accused of racial discrimination by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Texaco CEO Peter Budjar pledged an impartial investigation, brought in a respected outside jurist to conduct it, and publicly acknowledged the need for improvement in hiring and promotion procedures. Media coverage, which was intense, waned.

While each of these five strategies may represent an appropriate response to crisis, it’s also important to realize that shifts in strategy may occur – or become necessary. Most commonly, strategic shifts will militate towards “mutual problem-solving.” For example, in 1996, the EEOC sued Mitsubishi over sexual discrimination in the workplace. The company first responded in a “free to attack” mode. After several months, however, the results were an increase in negative media coverage, a U.S. boycott, and protests at Tokyo corporate headquarters. The company changed course, replaced the management of the U.S. subsidiary, and moved into the “mutual problem-solving” mode. An outside overseer was appointed to examine and change employment policies.

By contrast, A.H. Robins, which made the Dalkon Shield, employed a “free to ignore” strategy when confronted with scores of reports that the controversial birth control device was malfunctioning and causing harm. When media attention heightened and lawsuits were about to be filed, it shifted to “free to attack” and attempted to vilify the women who brought suit, alleging an assortment of unsavory personal behaviors as the cause of the malfunctions. This damaged Robins’ credibility and reputation immensely. The company went bankrupt and was later acquired by a competitor.

Effective Tactics

Once a strategy is chosen, companies must assess which tactics will best help achieve their desired objectives. Regardless of the strategy, all corporate leaders should follow one inviolate rule: Do not lie to the press. Lying to the press is like throwing blood into the shark tank. Lies are always found out. Beechnut found out the hard way when its “100%” apple juice was found to contain a cocktail of sugar and water and very little real fruit juice. The company was fined $2 million and its president pleaded guilty to felony charges.

Companies must also assess reporters’ motivations. Reporters can lie, too. It is incumbent upon executives to conduct due diligence on the media, to know with whom they’re dealing. And leaders should never commit to put themselves or other members of their organization on the phone or in front of the camera unless they are trained and capable. A more personal touch from the top might ensure the best possible stories in one or two key business and trade media. Executives should also avoid saying “no comment.” The phrase has come to be associated with admission of guilt. It’s far better to provide a sense of the process involved. Finally, they should avoid the blame trap. For many organizations, the instinctive response to accusations of blame is first to deny and then later find a scapegoat. Yet nothing sets off a feeding frenzy among the press more quickly than an attempt to shift blame that doesn’t stand up to scrutiny.

very crisis response must balance responsible behavior with protecting reputation. Those are not mutually exclusive concepts. Accepting responsibility can be different from taking the blame. It can also be the best way to move forward to address the real crisis, and at the same time develop support from the general public, the media, and other key audiences.

“Whenever a company can position its response as a meaningful effort to acknowledge and correct the phenomenon that led to the crisis, media coverage will become more favorable.”

Let’s contrast the handling of two similar crises by two oil companies. In 1989, the Exxon Valdez spilled tons of oil into pristine Prince William Sound in Alaska. More than a decade later, Exxon still is vilified by many for its mishandling of that crisis. Seemingly at every turn, Exxon’s response was hostile and combative. First, the company tried to assign blame to the single individual – the “drunken” boat captain. This tactic begged the question as to whether Exxon had put too much responsibility in one set of shaky hands, and without adequate backup systems. Then, the company appeared to fight cleanup efforts and besmirched those with concerns about the pollution of the sound, creating fresh enemies at every turn. Each of those strategies ensured that Exxon’s name would forever be associated with a well-covered disaster.

In contrast, few today remember that Ashland Oil experienced its own disastrous spill. In 1988, 700,000 gallons of diesel fuel poured from a ruptured Ashland tank and was carried by the Monongahela River into the Ohio River, threatening the drinking water of Pittsburgh and an estimated one million people in Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Ohio. Because Ashland’s CEO insisted that local media be apprised immediately of the situation and what the company was doing about it, the story remained under control. The company signaled that it was more important to accept responsibility and do something about the crisis, rather than stop to figure out whether real blame lay with the builder of the storage tank, or the manufacturer of the steel from which the tank was constructed. By keeping the media informed, Ashland was able to limit conjecture and rumor and to reduce the avalanche of criticism that such a significant oil spill would normally produce.

Avoiding the media may work sometimes, but in a time of crisis, it won’t work for long. The press can find too many other sources of information – disgruntled employees, state environmental officials, competitors – many of whom may be more than happy for the media exposure. However, occasionally avoiding calls may be an appropriate short-term strategy – and the best way to temporarily delay media contact is to issue a “holding statement” that doesn’t misrepresent current circumstances and provides enough information to fend off additional questions.

good rule of thumb against which to measure crisis response is to take “the 60 Minutes Test,” named after the grand-daddy of all investigative television programs. Executives should answer three questions: What did you know? When did you know about it? What did you do once you knew about it? Acknowledging an appropriate level of responsibility and helping drive toward solutions is the best way to pass this test and win acquittal in the Court of Public Opinion. When it comes to reminding the public of alleged or actual corporate errors, missteps or misdeeds, the media suffers no amnesia. As a Native American proverb instructs: “Don’t shoot an arrow that will return against you.”

Irv Schenkler is clinical associate professor of management communication at NYU Stern.

This article is adapted from Guide to Media Relations, by Irv Schenkler and Tony Herrling (Prentice Hall, 2004).